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This analysis is based on my guidebook to 1500m tactics, available here on thcson.com. This race, the women’s first semifinal in the London Olympics, can be viewed on YouTube:

Race video on YouTube

Women’s 1500m semifinal 1

Relative ability

Season bests (as reported in the start list) give the following classification for this heat:

Favorites: Kostetskaya, Uceny, Dobriskey, Alptekin

Average contestants: Harrer, Rowbury, Stellingwerff, McKnight, Van Dalen, England

Underdogs: Fernandez, Belete

Pace

Relatively fast: 400m 1.06,06 and 800m 2.15,32

The start

The start is a bit unusual because the three inside starters Kostetskaya, Harrer and Uceny all start faster than the rest of the field. This allows Uceny to take first position in the green queue behind the leader, which normally would be difficult for a runner starting third from the inside. The rest of the field settles in as expected.

The jog

Kostetskaya clearly intends to take the lead in the start and she leads the jog with a fast pace. She’s the number two favorite in this race behind Alptekin and apparently comfortable running in front. Not many runners share this preference.

Kostetskaya’s pacemaking leaves all the other runners locked into their positions all the way from 200m to the end of the jog at 1000m. The only exception is Dobriskey. She uses the 600-700 straight to move up from last place in the red queue to third place in the green. This is a somewhat risky tactical move when the pace is fast. Although Dobriskey successfully passes many opponents on the straight, there isn’t enough room for her to properly move into the green queue before the curve (700-800). She ends up running this curve in the middle of lane 2.

On the back straight (800-900) Dobriskey still can’t find a position closer to the inside, so she takes on extra distance in the next curve (900-1000) as well. Kostetskaya has now slowed down considerably, which also works to Dobriskey’s disadvantage because it prevents her from finding any gaps inside. On the other hand it is also easier for Dobriskey to keep up in the curves when the pace is slower. She does maintain good striking position in the green queue, which might have been worth the extra distance after all.

The surge

The pace increases at the 1000m mark, but most runners are surprisingly passive on the straight (1000-1100). This might be because all four favorites are in front. They will probably not be easy to pass, so average contestants and underdogs may as well conserve their strength in the curve (1100-1200) before beginning the sprint. The race has also been fairly fast, which could make a move to the outside too costly.

Belete breaks the pattern with a sudden sprint outward just before 1100m. It might have been wiser for her to sprint earlier on the straight, because now she’s forced to run a wide curve. But she runs fast enough to pass everyone except Alptekin in the curve, so she achieves what she intended.

Rowbury’s response to Belete’s acceleration at 1080m is also worth noting. Rowbury was in the red queue in the first lap and then held a blue position to the end of the jog. At 1000m she’s in 9th place, inconveniently separated from the four favorites. However, when Belete jumps out Rowbury suddenly sees an opening and immediately accelerates. This quick reaction was essential to her success in the sprint in this race, because it allowed her to follow Uceny. If Harrer or McKnight had filled the gap instead, Rowbury would have had to work past them. She would probably not have qualified for the final. This illustrates why it’s so crucial to fill gaps quickly in the surge.

The sprint

In the end Belete did not quite manage to keep her bold sprint going all the way to the finish. The sprint was a full-speed race where no contestants had to make tactical decisions.

This analysis is based on my guidebook to 1500m tactics, available here on thcson.com. This time I will analyze the men’s first semifinal in the London Olympics:

Race video on YouTube

Men’s 1500m semifinal 1

Relative ability

Season bests (as reported in the start list) give the following classification for this heat:

Favorites: Makhloufi, Kiprop, Gebremedhin

Average contestants: Driouch, Murray, Gregson, Kowal, Moustaoui, Shaween (both Moustaoui and Shaween have slow season bests but fast times from 2011)

Underdogs: Ingebrigtsen, Wheating, Manzano

Pace

The beginning was the slowest men’s race in the Oympics: 400m 1.03,73 and 800m 2.07,20. However, the surge was fast.

The start

This is an interesting start because two favorites (Makhloufi & Kiprop) and one underdog (Ingebrigtsen) seem anxious to lead. Starting sixth from the inside, Makhloufi is fastest and takes the inside lane after about 50m. Inside starters Ingebrigtsen and Driouch also start very fast and Ingebrigtsen even passes Makhloufi before the curve. In principle there shouldn’t be a reason to pass a favorite who wants to lead, but Ingebrigtsen’s move may be a reaction to Makhloufi slowing down at 80m. In any case, Ingebrigtsen gets lucky when Kiprop, another pre-race favorite, decides to accelerate and take the lead. Kiprop may not have intended to lead. Makhloufi slowing down on the inside seems to move him in front unexpectedly.

The jog

Kiprop runs the first curve in lane 2, clearly reluctant to lead the group. But Ingebrigtsen wisely stays half a step behind him in lane 1 to avoid the lead position. This is good tactical running from them both, and it results in a slow first lap, as one would expect. Kiprop and Ingebrigtsen wait for someone to move up from the back of the group, but this does not happen.

Realising that the pace is slow, Murray makes a nice move on the first straight (200-300) all the way from the back to third place. He gets past the entire group without wasting any energy at all. He must have thought about, and perhaps executed, this tactic before.

Not much changes from 300m to 600m. It’s starting to feel likely that only five direct qualifiers from this semifinal will make it to the final as the field passes 600m at 1.35.

The surge

In  this race the surge starts very early as a collective acceleration at 650m. The pressure building up around Gregson disturbs his rhythm and he jumps to the front partly to avoid the pushing. Kiprop doesn’t want to be boxed in, so he moves past Gregson on the inside. Gregson did not seem too keen on taking the lead in the first place. The sudden movements from 650-720m are so quick and unpredictable that it’s largely a matter of luck where runners in the middle of the pack find themselves in the curve (700-800). Kowal makes a good move forward on the straight (600-700) and even takes the lead for a moment, but he’s apparently not expecting the pace to increase, so he slows down at the exact moment when Gregson jumps forward. Much of the gains Kowal made on the straight are lost when the curve begins, as other runners pursue Gregson and Kiprop more actively. This illustrates the difficulty of tactical running in a very slow race. You have to be ready to respond to new events, even when you have just successfully completed your previous tactical move.

Kiprop now sets such a good pace (57 seconds) that everyone pretty much stays in the same position from 700 to 1100m. The others clearly have their hands full in trying to follow him. At this point Kiprop’s only tactic is to lead all the way to the finish by himself. If he slows down, he will soon be boxed in.

The 700-1100 lap is tough for the runners in the outside lanes. Gregson, Murray, Moustaoui, Gebremedhin and Shaween run both curves in lane 2. In order to cover the lap in 57 seconds, they in fact have to run at 55,9 seconds / 400m pace. However, I don’t think any of them could have reasonably avoided lane 2 in this lap. In a slow race, especially a semifinal, all runners are going to feel fresh when the surge begins. There will not be any open gaps on the inside until someone tires. As we see in this race, that can take a while.

Inside runners such as Driouch, Ingebrigtsen and Manzano have the good fortune of running a short distance in the 700-1100 lap, but they still face the risk of being boxed in as the final lap begins. Kiprop saves them from this fate by accelerating again at 1100m. Gregson, Murray, Moustaoui, Gebremedhin and Shaween are forced to run yet another curve in lane 2 since the green queue fails to make any progress over the red queue. Makhloufi ran the 700-1100 lap in blue position. He now utilizes the space left open by fading outside runners to move into better striking position as the sprint begins.

The sprint

Neither stage of this sprint is tactical since every runner seems to be running pretty much at maximum speed already on the back straight (1200-1300). However, it’s worth noting that underdogs Manzano and Ingebrigtsen manage to outsprint many stronger opponents. Their inside positions in the surge clearly had something to do with their success in the sprint, and Kiprop’s tactic in the front clearly benefited them. Moustaoui makes the unfortunate mistake of letting Ingebrigtsen pass him on the inside just before the finish line.

This analysis is based on my guidebook to 1500m tactics, available here on thcson.com. This time I will analyze women’s round 1 and heat 3 in the London Olympics.

Race video on YouTube

Women’s 1500m round 1 heat 3

Relative ability

Season bests (as reported in the start lists) give the following classification for this heat:

Favorites: Kostetskaya, Uceny, Mishchenko, Dibaba

Average contestants: Bulut, Kipyegon, Achola, Macias, Sifuentes, Weightman

Underdogs: Landaverde, Kareiva, Belete, Desalegn, Buckman

Pace

This race was on the border between fast and slow in the jog stage, 400m 1.10,71 and 800m 2.18,19. The end of the race was fast.

The start

The start looks a bit slow and nobody seems willing to take the lead. The only one who makes a tactical move is inside starter Kipyegon. She handily passes the entire field from the back. The other runners go slowly and settle in precisely where their starting position predicted they would.

The jog

Macias does a nice job of avoiding the lead position by simply running slow enough in the inside lane. Dibaba seems to be a bit reluctant to take the lead but eventually does so. The pace look slow as the runners complete the first lap, and Uceny makes a good tactical move from 300-500 as she runs a wider curve to pass the group and settles in the front position in the green queue, the ideal place for a favorite. Kipyegon and Dibaba then accelerate the pace from 600-700, which makes it hard for anyone else to move up from the back of the field.

The surge

Already at 800m the surge has clearly begun. In fact the third lap goes very fast, in 1.01. At this pace the runners don’t really have to think about tactics at all. However, it’s important, especially for favorites, to remember that six runners qualify for the next round. Some runners close to the front are bound to get more tired than the favorites themselves. A favorite does not need to be in a hurry when the surge is long and fast.

Pre-race favorite Kostetskaya takes on some unnecessary distance in the 1100-1200 curve by running outside of Uceny. Kostetskaya does not seem to realize that she is seventh, so she only has to pass one opponent in the sprint to qualify.

The sprint

Dibaba pays the price for leading the race when she fades in the sprint. If her strategy was to lead and make a long surge, it failed badly. Kipyegon, who shared pacemaking duties with Dibaba, also gets beaten in the sprint. The sprint doesn’t contain any tactics this time, but it’s good to note how far from the front some qualifiers were with one lap to go. Bulut, Belete, Kaireva, Uceny, Kostetskaya were in positions 3-7, respectively, and Weightman was 9th. Sifuentes and Buckman, who qualified by time, were 11th and 12th. Buckman was probably 12 meters behind the leader Kipyegon at 1100m. So runners at the back of the field in a fast race should not give up hope. Qualification can be much closer than it seems.

This analysis is based on my guidebook to 1500m tactics, available here on thcson.com. This time I will analyze men’s round 1 and heat 3 in the London Olympics.

Race video on YouTube

Men’s 1500m round 1 heat 3

Relative ability

Season bests (as reported in the start lists) give the following classification for this heat:

Favorites: Willis, Chepseba, Schlangen

Average contestants: Iguider, Ruiz, Noor, Centrowitz, Kowal, Ingebrigtsen

Underdogs: Villanueva, Vojta, O’Lionaird, Vazquez

One contestant, Aman Wote, could not be found on my start list.

Pace

A relatively slow race: 400m 59,51 and 800m 2.03,50

The start

In the later races Ingebrigtsen turned out to be the most succesful 1500m tactician in London. In this race he utilizes his lucky starting position on the outside of the field. He starts fast to get ahead of the field, stays on the outside and starts looking to his left at 80m, ready to slow down and settle in behind the fastest starter on the inside. Noor takes the lead and Ingebrigtsen moves in behind him by pushing him gently forward. It’s hard to imagine a more successfully executed started from the outside.

Pre-race favorite Willis also does well despite an unlucky starting position on the inside. He goes out slowly enough to be left behind the group, moves out when he gets the chance and then passes most of the field in the first curve even though the pace does not slow down. This much extra distance in the first curve might not be a good tactical decision for an underdog or an average contestant, but a favorite can probably afford to expend a bit more energy early on. Willis now has a green position, which suits favorites well.

The jog

It’s hard to understand why Chepseba takes the lead in the jog. His season best is more than 5 second faster than that of an average contestant in this field. A favorite leading the race slowly is inexplicable from a tactical standpoint.

With a favorite in the lead, the other runners more or less stay put during the beginning of the jog. The first one who makes a move on the outside is Kowal, who executes a great overtaking between 600-700m. Kowal is actually the last runner in the field at 500 and is even boxed in a bit by Vasquez in the curve, but he steps outward just when the curve ends and easily passes the entire field on the straight. The important thing to notice is that he makes this tactical decision at an early stage of the race when no other runners are active. The same move would have required a lot more energy on the next straight, 800-900m, when the jog is just about to end. It might even have been impossible.

Vojta and O’Lionard also accelerate after Kowal passes them, but they are a bit late and end up doing a lot of work on the outside without much to show for it. The fight for good positions is a lot more intense on the back straight 800-900, so Vojta and O’Lionard only manage to maintain their positions. This is the risk that underdogs always face in the green positions. If they fail to move forward and/or move closer to the inside early in the race, they end up wasting far too much energy on running wide curves.

Chepseba seems to accelerate at 800m and Willis immediately takes advantage of this opportunity to move out of the box. His position in second place behind a favorite is obviously the ideal place to be when the surge begins.

The surge

Willis makes another astute tactical move at 1000m. He initially follows Chepseba but takes a look to his right in the middle of the 1000-1100 straight. He sees the pressure building up on his outside and realizes that he’s running too slowly and may get boxed in soon. He therefore passes Chepseba and takes the lead with the clear intent to lead all the way to the finish. For a pre-race favorite this is a good decision.

Chepseba should now only follow Willis in the inside lane – it’s clearly a good assumption that he won’t get boxed in when he follows a leading favorite through the end of the surge and the sprint. But Chepseba makes a horrible tactical decision as he forces his way outward in the middle of the 1100-1200 curve. Kowal and Ingebrigtsen both take advantage of the space vacated by Chepseba as they latch on to Willis, Iguider and Schlangen.

The sprint

It’s interesting to compare Kowal’s and Ingebrigtsen’s sprint on the inside to Chepseba’s sprint on the outside. From 1150m to the finish Chepseba runs a distance which is at least 5m longer, if not 10m longer than Kowal’s and Ingebrigtsen’s inside route. If Chepseba had followed the leading favorite on the inside he would have qualified easily.

Ruiz puts a good effort into the first sprint 1200-1300 as he rises from the back of the field to third place. This is a good tactical move, but in the end Schlangen beats Ruiz with a more even sprint by one hundredth of a second.

Centrowitz sets himself up nicely for the first sprint behind Chepseba. He has to jump outside as Chepseba stumbles, but he clearly aims for 6th position and trusts his sprint on the home straight. Ingebrigtsen gives Kowal a slight push in the back just before the finish line when he has nowhere to go and fears that someone might pass him on the outside. Perhaps I should include the push move in my tactical guide as well.

This analysis is based on my guidebook to 1500m tactics, available here on thcson.com. This time I will analyze women’s round 1 and heat 2 at the London Olympics.

Race video on YouTube

Women’s 1500m round 1 heat 2

Relative ability

Season bests (as reported in the start lists) give the following classification for this heat:

Favorites: Martynova, Alptekin, Dobriskey, Hilali

Average contestants: Plis, Assefa, McKnight, Shumi, Sum, Simpson

Underdogs: Saholinirina, Fernandez, Sankuru, Roman

Pace

A slow heat at last, with intermediate times 1.10,78 and 2.23,47.

The start

Martynova and Assefa might be the most interesting contestants in the start from a tactical perspective. Martynova starts second from the inside. As I mentioned in my guidebook, an inside starter who prefers to be in the green queue has to start slowly and move up from the back of the field. This is what Martynova does in heat 2 as she deliberately avoids the pack in front of her.

Martynova settles in at the back of the field and clearly recognizes in the first curve that the pace is very slow. She immediately takes advantage of this by passing Sum on the outside, improving her position quite a lot without expending almost any extra energy. That’s a good tactical move in any stage of the race.

Assefa, on the other hand, expends a lot of energy at the start without reaping any benefit at all. After a slow start she makes a full-speed sprint straight into the group, disrupting her (and others’) rhythm as she goes. She gains a few positions on the inside with her sprint, but it doesn’t seem worth the effort she put in.

The jog

The jog proceeds at a 1.12-1.13 / 400m pace, which is easy for all runners. When the jog is slow the surge can be expected to start early, so all athletes at the back of the field should at least consider a move to the outside as long as the pace is so slow that the field can be overtaken easily. Saholinirina, Shumi and Sum take advantage of this from 400 to 600. In contrast, pre-race favorite Martynova runs very passively on the outside as she falls back in the green queue in the same interval. This is not a fatal tactical error, but it means that she will have to work her way past the whole field again, with little to go before the surge begins.

Simpson, who should perhaps also have been considered one of the pre-race favorites, initially seems to react (at 550) and move outward after Saholinirina passes her, but she then runs passively as Shumi and Sum pass by. She ends up at the back of the green queue just ahead of Martynova, with the same problem. Both Martynova and Simpson should have moved further out when they realized they were about to be overtaken, especially on the straights. Even in the curves they could easily afford to run a few extra meters at this pace. Their tactical plan should have been to discourage other runners from moving past them by making the field wider. It requires a lot more work to pass a field which is three runners wide than one which is two runners wide.

The other favorites perform better in terms of jog tactics. Alptekin calmly stays first in the red queue behind the leading Fernandez. Hilali is first in the green queue on Fernandez shoulder. Dobriskey wisely hooks onto Alptekin when Assefa moves outward at 600.

The surge

The surge begins around the 900m mark, with two favorites (Simpson and Martynova) at the back of the field and the other three close to the front. The leader, Fernandez, is perhaps the most interesting athlete in the surge. As an underdog who’s led the race from the start, she’s in a terrible position. As I’ve explained in my guide, Fernandez’ only choice now is to resist overtaking as long as possible. She does exactly this until 1050m. Then she gets lucky when one of the pre-race favorites, Hilali, takes the lead as the final lap begins. Fernandez snaps onto Hilali and avoids being boxed in. This allows her to expend all her strength effectively in the sprint while staying in the inside lane. If Fernandez had been stuck behind an average contestant or an underdog at 1100m, she probably would have been boxed in much worse in the sprint.

It’s also interesting to note how limited the tactical options are for Simpson and Martynova in the surge. As the field spreads out after the 1000m point, it’s four runners wide and the pace is fast. Simpson and Martynova have no chance of passing the entire field before the curve begins. Their only option is to wait at the back of the group until the sprint.

Sum and McKnight both make good moves outside on the 1000-1100 straight. Shumi realizes this but moves out a bit too late when they’ve both already gone past her. Pre-race favorite Dobriskey stays cool on the inside and escapes the box easily just before the sprint begins. Clearly she benefits from Fernandez’ lucky break. If Fernandez had been passed by many outside runners, Dobriskey would have fallen much further back. But the pace at the end of the surge is so fast that the group begins to spread out, leaving just enough room for Dobriskey to get out. So even though the jog was slow in this race, the fast surge compensated and the sprint won’t be very crowded.

The sprint

Since this has been a slow race, the athletes have to assume that the six direct qualifiers will be the only ones to go through. Not much changes on the final back straight 1200-1300. McKnight leads the field through the final curve at a quick pace. Martynova probably loses her qualification spot by slowing down slightly at the end, but no tactical decisions impact the outcome of this sprint.

Martynova and Simpson provided the best tactical lesson in this race. They were passive in the jog and fell behind. They did not seize their final opportunity on the 800-900 straight to move up before the surge. As a consequence, they were in a very disadvantageous positions when the sprint began. One of them managed to compensate for these tactical mistakes with a blazing sprint, the other did not.