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Here’s a tactical recap of the 1500m heats which ended a moment ago. It is based on the tactical guidebook I have published on this webpage.

Race videos

Heat 1

Heat 2

Heat 3

Analyses

Heat 1

Coneo set a fast pace in this heat. With the first 6 in each heat + 6 fastest times qualifying for the semifinals it seemed likely that a lot of athletes would go through from this heat. Consequently there wasn’t much tactics in this heat, but it was interesting to observe how closely packed the lead group staid until the final meters at such a fast pace. Rowbury and Johnson were boxed in throughout the sprint and Rowbury could easily have fallen out of the top six if Chepkwemoi had faded in the end. There was not much that Rowbury could have done differently in the sprint, but in the end the fast pace was fast enough to carry the entire lead group to the semifinals, even Coneo who fell behind in the sprint.

Heat 2

Hassan took a very passive strategy in this heat by moving directly to the back of the red queue in the start. Aregawi also started slowly but moved to the green queue instead, which is a better tactic for favorites. Simpson utilized her outside start position nicely to stay on the outside and find a place at the front of the green queue.

The jog stage was very unusual, as Tomasova went off one her own and Simpson decided not to follow her at the 300m mark. After that the main group ran its own race and Tomasova her own. Seyaum volunteered for pace-keeping duty in the main group and managed to pull away from the others in the sprint without any danger of boxing. However, she wasted a lot of energy in this heat, first by pace-keeping and then by running a pointless sprint against Hassan for first place. She may struggle in the semifinals tomorrow with no rest day in between.

Hassan waited until the 1200m mark before she made her move and this was clearly a wise tactic, as she easily overtook seven or eight opponents in the first sprint. Hassan will have to adopt a more active strategy in the semifinals when the competition is tougher.

Heat 3

It’s always interesting to see how an overwhelming favorite runs in the first round. Dibaba started with the same strategy as Hassan, deliberately taking the last position in the start. This might be the best way to stay of trouble if there’s any scuffling in the beginning. Dibaba then moved up to a good position in the green queue on the 600-700 straight, but failed to defend this position on the following 800-900 straight when Magnani overtook her. Dibaba then overtook Magnani in the 900-1000 bend to correct her mistake, and on the following 1000-1100 she paid closer attention when she stopped Terzic from overtaking her. Dibaba’s sprint was well-timed and secure, although a 59 second lap was clearly excessive in this round.

This was a moderately fast heat even before Dibaba took the lead, so there wasn’t much tactics involved for the other runners. Everyone had plenty of space in the sprint. Kipyegon probably used too much energy by running the second lap in lane 2, moving up to take the lead at 900m and then following Dibaba all the way on her final 59 second lap. Kipyegon will probably feel this in her legs tomorrow much more than Dibaba. Weightman ran a smarter sprint by letting Dibaba go and slowing down just enough to secure a place in the top six.

This analysis is based on my guidebook to 1500m tactics, available here on thcson.com. In this post I will analyze the women’s final in the London Olympics, which can be viewed on YouTube:

Race video on YouTube

Women’s 1500m final

Relative ability

Season bests and previous heats give the following classification for this heat:

Favorites: Tomashova, Obiri, Aregawi, Alptekin, Kostetskaya

Average contestants: Rowbury, Kareiva, Klocova, Bulut, Jamal, Uceny, Dobriskey, Weightman

Underdogs: So many runners ran fast in the second semifinal that nobody really stood out as an underdog in the final.

Pace

The race started slowly but the pace increased gradually: 400m 1.15,12 and 800m 2.23,97

The start

This was perhaps the most calm 1500m start in these Olympics. Bulut and the other inside and middle starters end up in red or blue positions behind her. All outside starters take green positions as expected. Nobody makes a tactical move.

The jog

It seems like Bulut did not intend to be a pacemaker at this stage, so she slows the pace to a crawl in the first curve in the inside lane. This isn’t an effective way to exit the front position, as I explained in my guide. Nobody else wants to lead, so eventually Bulut decides to go to the front after all. Perhaps Bulut reasoned that she won’t be any worse off leading the field at this pace than if she’s boxed into the red queue.

Tomasova kept a fast pace both in her heat and her semifinal, but she is now unable to do so. I assume she would have liked to use her favorite strategy in the final as well, but she gets boxed in from the beginning and Bulut’s slowdown in prevents her from moving outward until after the 800m point. This shows how crucial starting position can be. In order to take get into the green queue Tomashova would have had to either start fast enough to beat the outside starters or start slowly enough to take the last position in the green queue and move up from there.

Bulut increase the pace a little in the second lap, but it is still remarkable that nobody changes positions. Weightman and Dobriskey don’t move up on the outside from 400-700m. Even more surprisingly, pre-race favorite Obiri remains at the back of the field even though she could surely have move up to the front with ease on the 600-700 straight.

Bulut seems to increase the pace again at 800m and the group finally starts to become a bit restless. Tomashova forces her way further out, but remains partly boxed in behind Uceny.

The surge

At 1000m Jamal, Kostetskaya and Uceny are all in ideal striking position in the green queue. It’s surprising that Aregawi and Obiri don’t try harder to move upward on the 1000-1100 straight. Their positions at the back of the green queue expose them to a lot of extra distance in the 1100-1200 curve with little tactical benefit.

On the 1000-1100 straight Rowbury makes a serious tactical mistake when she leaves an open gap in the red queue which Alptekin proceeds to fill. Tomashova remains boxed into a blue position. She is freed from the box when Uceny’s unfortunate fall disrupts the green queue on the outside, but the pace is already so fast that she declines the opportunity to move outward.

Just before the 1200m point Alptekin gets out her red position, apparently by utilizing the gap left by Kostetskaya when she’s unable to keep up with Jamal in the green queue.

The sprint

Aregawi comes storming on the outside as the sprint begins, but her loss of rhythm after Uceny’s fall is costly in the sprint. Bulut puts together an amazing sprint considering that she led the race for so long. All in all there weren’t any tactical moves to discuss in this sprint.

Overall the women’s final was noteworthy mostly for its lack of change in positions. The inside starters were in the red queue, middle starters in blue positions and outside starters in the green queue pretty much all the way from the start to 1100m. This shows how important it can be to consider your starting positions in strategic pre-race plans. Inside starters who prefer to be in the green queue, as Tomashova probably did, may have to do a deliberately slow start and then work their way up from the back of the field. With a normal start they may find themselves boxed in for several laps.

Another thing to note is Alptekin’s good luck in the final lap. She’s in the blue queue just before 1100m, but then Rowbury leaves a gap in the red queue so that Alptekin can run the 1100-1200 curve in lane 1. Kostetskaya then fades on the outside just as the sprint begins, allowing Alptekin to break out of the box. If Aregawi had been in the green queue instead of Kostetskaya, Alptekin’s options would have much more restricted at least in the first stage of the sprint.

This analysis is based on my guidebook to 1500m tactics, available here on thcson.com. This time I will analyze the men’s final in the London Olympics.

Race video on YouTube

Men’s 1500m final

Relative ability

Season bests and previous heats give the following classification for this heat:

Favorites: Makhloufi’s dominant sprints in both of his heats made him the primary favorite. Kiprop, Kiplagat, Chepseba and Willis were secondary favorites based on season bests.

Average contestants: Iguider, Gebremedhin, Ozbilen

Underdogs: Centrowitz, Manzano, Ali, Ingebrigtsen

Pace

The final was relatively fast, 400m 58,30 and 800m 1.58,63, possibly because some runners wanted to neutralize Makhloufi’s sprint.

The start

This is a strange start. The primary pre-race favorite Makhloufi goes out very fast and looks set to take the lead, but Iguider goes through a lot of trouble to move behind Makhloufi’s and go past him. It is hard to see why Iguider so desperately wants to avoid running behind a favorite in the inside lane, but perhaps the excitement just gave him an extra burst of adrenaline. Ingebrigtsen and Ali also seem assertive with their fast starts. Kiprop takes it easy, which leaves him at the back of the field.

The jog

Iguider does not intend to keep a fast pace, so Ali and Chepseba pass him easily on the 200-300 straight. Kiprop also moves up on the outside, but for some reason he does not latch onto Chepseba. One would assume that second position in the green queue, behind a compatriot whose also a favorite, would be ideal for Kiprop. Instead, his primary rival Makhloufi moves into that green position. If Kiprop would have kept up with Chepseba, Makhloufi could have been enclosed in a blue position instead, forcing him to make more difficult tactical decisions in the later stages of the race. Kiprop never manages to move up after this initial hesitation. He seems to have had a very bad day.

Ali keeps the pace fast and the other runners settle in good order into two queues. Absolutely nothing changes in the field during the second lap. As they come through 800m in 1.58,63, it’s clear that pace hasn’t been fast enough to neutralize Makhloufi’s sprint, so the Kenyans could perhaps look to cooperate in a long and fast surge. Unfortunately for Chepseba, he’s the only one of the three Kenyans who’s anywhere near the lead. He takes the front position at 900m. Makhloufi has kept an eye on Chepseba, as he should have, and he immediately moves one step forward in the green queue when Chepseba takes the lead.

Centrowitz also makes a good tactical move in going outward on the 800-900 straight. He has first position in the red queue behind Ali, but Ali is an underdog and has been keeping the pace for a long time, so staying put behind him would probably leave Centrowitz boxed in when the surge begins. By moving one step outward Centrowitz takes first place in the green queue just as Chepseba takes the lead, which is clearly an excellent tactical position.

The surge

The surge begins as Chepseba takes the lead. Willis and Ingebrigtsen seem to be in trouble on the inside in the 900-100 curve because they’re stuck behind Ali. Luckily for them, Ali decides to fight his way outward instead of following Chepseba, so Willis and Ingebrigtsen both get to move one step forward in the red queue for free. This is pure luck on their part, but it puts them both in good position behind pre-race favorites in the inside lane.

On the outside, Gebremedhin and Kiplagat move up in the 900-1000 curve. Kiplagat probably goes all the way out to lane 3 to move past Gebremedhin. These are good tactical moves by them both, because the outside routes would probably have been blocked by Iguider (whom they both pass in the curve) if they had waited to the 1000-1100 straight. Since this is the final and the competition is very even, the price for a good position on the outside is higher than it was in the heats.

Kiplagat moves up to Makhloufi’s shoulder at 1000m. Makhloufi again makes the right tactical move as he blocks Kiplagat by moving forward, thus avoiding the boxed-in blue position. As a pre-race favorite with a strong sprint, he clearly makes the right decision. All pre-race favorites except Kiprop are at the front as the last lap begins. Centrowitz, who scored a medal the year before in Daegu, is among them.

The sprint

The sprint begins at 1100m, as it often does in the final. The pace is so fast through the 1100-1200 curve that noone can change positions. Makhloufi strikes at 1200 as he did in the heats. Chepseba cannot respond and the field spreads out widely. The only tactical question is when runners at the back of the group pass Chepseba. Centrowitz and Willis are slow to react to Makhloufi’s move, letting Kiplagat, Gebremedhin and Iguider all pass them and Chepseba on the outside. Judging from the final stages of the sprint Willis may already have been out of energy at 1200, but Centrowitz comes close to a medal, so in retrospect he probably should have sprinted past Chepseba on the 1200-1300 straight instead of in the curve.

Manzano’s sprint is a sight to behold, so it’s worthwhile to recap his earlier tactics during the race. His starting position gave him a position in the green queue for the first lap, then he ran close to the back of the red queue for the rest of jog. When Chepseba initiated the surge he stayed inside behind Ingebrigtsen and actually seemed to have trouble keeping up at the 1000m mark. One would think that an underdog cannot have any chance of sprinting successfully from so far behind, especially in a final. But he runs the final 200 in 26,5 while Kiplagat and Gebremedhin only manage 28,9 and 28,1, respectively. Ingebrigtsen runs 27,1 for the final 200, passing both Gebremedhin and Kiplagat to take fifth place.

With three underdogs in the top 5, this race is a testament to how much underdogs can achieve with smart tactics on a good day. It goes without saying that the differences between underdogs and others is small in a championship final. But the important tactical lesson which Manzano and Ingebrigtsen exemplify is that a fast finish can be incredibly effective in the final straight even against favorites. Many favorites run the last lap, if not the entire race, in the outside lanes. Kiplagat and Gebremedhin did so from 900 to 1300m. The price they pay for that outside running can be high in the final sprint, so underdogs with conserved energy have every reason to keep hope alive to the very end of the race.

As for the victor, there have been allegations of cheating due to his surprising improvement from the year before, but at least in terms of tactics he proved himself a worthy champion. He was twice at risk of being boxed in and responded on both occasions immediately with the right decision.

This analysis is based on my guidebook to 1500m tactics, available here on thcson.com. This race, the women’s second semifinal in the London Olympics, can be viewed on YouTube:

Race video on YouTube

Women’s 1500m semifinal 2

Relative ability

Season bests (as reported in the start list) give the following classification for this heat:

Favorites: Aregawi, Obiri, Tomashova

Average contestants: Simpson, Jamal, Hilali,  Weightman, Bulut, Sifuentes

Underdogs: Buckman, Kareiva, Klocova

Pace

The fastest race in these Olympics: 400m 1.05,58 and 800m 2.10,93.

The start

Athletes from the middle of the starting lineup move to the inside lanes very early, which clogs the inside lanes. Hilali, who started slower than the others from position 5, actually decides to move around all the outside starters on the first straight. The move is perhaps a bit excessive from an energy standpoint, but she moves up very nicely to second position in the green queue. When many athletes crowd to the inside lanes after the start, other athletes who started slower can sometimes overtake the group effectively on the outside without running much extra distance.

The jog

For a while it looks as if nobody’s very keen to lead, but then Tomashova breaks forward just after 200m. Knowing that she led most of the way in her heat, the other athletes can probably guess that Tomashova’s intention is to keep up a good pace. Bulut’s tactical reaction to Tomashova’s move is immediate. She moves up from a blue position at the back of the group to second position in the green queue well before the 300-400 curve. Her pre-race strategy may have been to latch on to Tomashova if she goes to the front again. She executes the move impressively.

Buckman is more timid and falls back on the 200-300 straight from the first position in the green queue. She gets a bit lucky as she finds a place in the inside lane. As an underdog Buckman was probably not keen on spending much time in the outside lanes. When many athletes simultaneously accelerate, the best tactic for an underdog stuck in the outside lanes can be to stay calm and move inside when a suitable gap opens.

Tomashova sets a blistering pace, well below season-bests for all the average contestants and underdogs in this race, so there’s not much tactics to speak of on their part. However, Hilali makes a tactical error when she moves out somewhere around the 650m point. Her position just before the move is excellent. She’s in blue position close to the front and the two athletes (Aregawi and Obiri) in green positions boxing her in are both pre-race favorites. Another favorite is leading the race and keeping up a fast pace. Under these circumstances it is very unlikely that Hilali could find herself in trouble before the sprint.

It’s not seen in the video, but apparently Hilali deliberately slows down, lets Jamal go past her on the outside, and then takes a green position behind Jamal. With two laps to go, in a fast race where at least five runners will qualify, there should be no reason to give up first place in the blue queue to run extra distance on the outside. In the end Hilali paid dearly for this decision.

The surge

The surge begins surprisingly early as Bulut takes the lead on the 800-900 straight. At the same time Hilali and Kareiva try to move past Jamal on the outside, and Hilali even moves up to Aregawi’s shoulder in the curve. These are surprisingly bold moves from average contestants and underdogs in a fast race. Kareiva in particular runs an excessively long distance in the 900-1000 curve when she’s unable to move inside. The  underdogs and average contestants who remain in the inside lanes have clearly made a better tactical decision. In a race like this there should not be any urgency to move forward in the early stages of the surge if it costs extra energy.

The sprint

The three favorites and Bulut pull away, followed by Hilali, Kareiva and Jamal, all of whom ran extra distance in the surge. Jamal and Kareiva surprisingly last all the way to the finish, and Kareiva in fact improves her personal best by four seconds despite her tactical mistakes. But Hilali runs out of steam in the final straight and fails to qualify. As so often in fast races, no tactical decisions are exhibited in the sprint.

This analysis is based on my guidebook to 1500m tactics, available here on thcson.com. This time I will analyze the men’s second semifinal in the London Olympics.

Race video on YouTube

Men’s 1500m semifinal 2

Relative ability

Season bests (as reported in the start list) give the following classification for this heat:

Favorites: Chepseba, Kiplagat, Willis

Average contestants: Baddeley, Ozbilen, Ali, Iguider, Schlangen, Brannen, Centrowitz

Underdogs: Carvalho, Al-Garni, Nikolaev

Pace

Since the first semifinal had been won in 3.42 everyone in the second semifinal probably knew that seven athletes would qualify if the pace was even moderately fast. Unsurprisingly this semifinal was fast, 400m 56,03 and 800m 1.54,67.

The start

Athletes from the middle of the lineup go out fastest. This leaves an unusual amount of open space in the middle of the group. Willis, for example, starts outside in position 12 but is able to move behind the lead group into lane 1 before the first curve. Ali deliberately takes the lead and the other fast starters are happy to settle in behind him.

The jog

Chepseba has decided to be the pacemaker and takes the lead at 300m. This is probably a good strategy considering how much he struggled in his heat with tactical errors and physical contact (he made it to the semifinal on appeal). Knowing that seven will qualify and with a season best 4-5 seconds faster than the average runner in this field, Chepseba plays it safe by leading.

Chepseba’s strategy makes the tactics very simple for the average runners and underdogs in this field: a favorite is leading and the pace is fast. The only thing to do is to hang on and minimize distance, preferably by running in lane 1.

The surge

As the jog ends at 1000m two underdogs and Brannen, who fell on the back straight, are already struggling to keep up the pace. The athletes in the front group may not know it yet, but with seven athletes set to qualify their task has already become easier. In any event, the pace remains so fast that everyone stays in their position, without giving much thought to tactics, I assume.

The sprint

The sprint is an all-out race with nothing interesting from a tactical viewpoint, except perhaps for Baddeley and Özbilen. These two athletes are even with 150m to go and Baddeley has been on Özbilen’s heels for the past 200m. In the final curve they catch two runners whose strengths are fading fast: Al-Garni and Schlangen. Özbilen immediately moves outward and goes past them at full speed, but Baddeley slows down and runs 30m behind Schlangen’s back before realizing that he has to pass him immediately. But Baddeley slow reaction leaves him with a 10m gap to Özbilen, which he cannot close in the final straight. Following Özbilen immediately might have given Baddeley a shot at qualification.

It’s important to realize which runners are fading in the final curve and to move past them immediately. It is of course hard to make tactical decisions in a state of fatigue, but Baddeley could perhaps have observed how quickly Ali got past Schlangen and concluded that he and Özbilen would also have to move past him when they catch up.