thcson.com

This analysis is based on my guidebook to 1500m tactics, available here on thcson.com. This race, the women’s second semifinal in the London Olympics, can be viewed on YouTube:

Race video on YouTube

Women’s 1500m semifinal 2

Relative ability

Season bests (as reported in the start list) give the following classification for this heat:

Favorites: Aregawi, Obiri, Tomashova

Average contestants: Simpson, Jamal, Hilali,  Weightman, Bulut, Sifuentes

Underdogs: Buckman, Kareiva, Klocova

Pace

The fastest race in these Olympics: 400m 1.05,58 and 800m 2.10,93.

The start

Athletes from the middle of the starting lineup move to the inside lanes very early, which clogs the inside lanes. Hilali, who started slower than the others from position 5, actually decides to move around all the outside starters on the first straight. The move is perhaps a bit excessive from an energy standpoint, but she moves up very nicely to second position in the green queue. When many athletes crowd to the inside lanes after the start, other athletes who started slower can sometimes overtake the group effectively on the outside without running much extra distance.

The jog

For a while it looks as if nobody’s very keen to lead, but then Tomashova breaks forward just after 200m. Knowing that she led most of the way in her heat, the other athletes can probably guess that Tomashova’s intention is to keep up a good pace. Bulut’s tactical reaction to Tomashova’s move is immediate. She moves up from a blue position at the back of the group to second position in the green queue well before the 300-400 curve. Her pre-race strategy may have been to latch on to Tomashova if she goes to the front again. She executes the move impressively.

Buckman is more timid and falls back on the 200-300 straight from the first position in the green queue. She gets a bit lucky as she finds a place in the inside lane. As an underdog Buckman was probably not keen on spending much time in the outside lanes. When many athletes simultaneously accelerate, the best tactic for an underdog stuck in the outside lanes can be to stay calm and move inside when a suitable gap opens.

Tomashova sets a blistering pace, well below season-bests for all the average contestants and underdogs in this race, so there’s not much tactics to speak of on their part. However, Hilali makes a tactical error when she moves out somewhere around the 650m point. Her position just before the move is excellent. She’s in blue position close to the front and the two athletes (Aregawi and Obiri) in green positions boxing her in are both pre-race favorites. Another favorite is leading the race and keeping up a fast pace. Under these circumstances it is very unlikely that Hilali could find herself in trouble before the sprint.

It’s not seen in the video, but apparently Hilali deliberately slows down, lets Jamal go past her on the outside, and then takes a green position behind Jamal. With two laps to go, in a fast race where at least five runners will qualify, there should be no reason to give up first place in the blue queue to run extra distance on the outside. In the end Hilali paid dearly for this decision.

The surge

The surge begins surprisingly early as Bulut takes the lead on the 800-900 straight. At the same time Hilali and Kareiva try to move past Jamal on the outside, and Hilali even moves up to Aregawi’s shoulder in the curve. These are surprisingly bold moves from average contestants and underdogs in a fast race. Kareiva in particular runs an excessively long distance in the 900-1000 curve when she’s unable to move inside. The  underdogs and average contestants who remain in the inside lanes have clearly made a better tactical decision. In a race like this there should not be any urgency to move forward in the early stages of the surge if it costs extra energy.

The sprint

The three favorites and Bulut pull away, followed by Hilali, Kareiva and Jamal, all of whom ran extra distance in the surge. Jamal and Kareiva surprisingly last all the way to the finish, and Kareiva in fact improves her personal best by four seconds despite her tactical mistakes. But Hilali runs out of steam in the final straight and fails to qualify. As so often in fast races, no tactical decisions are exhibited in the sprint.

This analysis is based on my guidebook to 1500m tactics, available here on thcson.com. This time I will analyze the men’s second semifinal in the London Olympics.

Race video on YouTube

Men’s 1500m semifinal 2

Relative ability

Season bests (as reported in the start list) give the following classification for this heat:

Favorites: Chepseba, Kiplagat, Willis

Average contestants: Baddeley, Ozbilen, Ali, Iguider, Schlangen, Brannen, Centrowitz

Underdogs: Carvalho, Al-Garni, Nikolaev

Pace

Since the first semifinal had been won in 3.42 everyone in the second semifinal probably knew that seven athletes would qualify if the pace was even moderately fast. Unsurprisingly this semifinal was fast, 400m 56,03 and 800m 1.54,67.

The start

Athletes from the middle of the lineup go out fastest. This leaves an unusual amount of open space in the middle of the group. Willis, for example, starts outside in position 12 but is able to move behind the lead group into lane 1 before the first curve. Ali deliberately takes the lead and the other fast starters are happy to settle in behind him.

The jog

Chepseba has decided to be the pacemaker and takes the lead at 300m. This is probably a good strategy considering how much he struggled in his heat with tactical errors and physical contact (he made it to the semifinal on appeal). Knowing that seven will qualify and with a season best 4-5 seconds faster than the average runner in this field, Chepseba plays it safe by leading.

Chepseba’s strategy makes the tactics very simple for the average runners and underdogs in this field: a favorite is leading and the pace is fast. The only thing to do is to hang on and minimize distance, preferably by running in lane 1.

The surge

As the jog ends at 1000m two underdogs and Brannen, who fell on the back straight, are already struggling to keep up the pace. The athletes in the front group may not know it yet, but with seven athletes set to qualify their task has already become easier. In any event, the pace remains so fast that everyone stays in their position, without giving much thought to tactics, I assume.

The sprint

The sprint is an all-out race with nothing interesting from a tactical viewpoint, except perhaps for Baddeley and Özbilen. These two athletes are even with 150m to go and Baddeley has been on Özbilen’s heels for the past 200m. In the final curve they catch two runners whose strengths are fading fast: Al-Garni and Schlangen. Özbilen immediately moves outward and goes past them at full speed, but Baddeley slows down and runs 30m behind Schlangen’s back before realizing that he has to pass him immediately. But Baddeley slow reaction leaves him with a 10m gap to Özbilen, which he cannot close in the final straight. Following Özbilen immediately might have given Baddeley a shot at qualification.

It’s important to realize which runners are fading in the final curve and to move past them immediately. It is of course hard to make tactical decisions in a state of fatigue, but Baddeley could perhaps have observed how quickly Ali got past Schlangen and concluded that he and Özbilen would also have to move past him when they catch up.

This analysis is based on my guidebook to 1500m tactics, available here on thcson.com. This race, the women’s first semifinal in the London Olympics, can be viewed on YouTube:

Race video on YouTube

Women’s 1500m semifinal 1

Relative ability

Season bests (as reported in the start list) give the following classification for this heat:

Favorites: Kostetskaya, Uceny, Dobriskey, Alptekin

Average contestants: Harrer, Rowbury, Stellingwerff, McKnight, Van Dalen, England

Underdogs: Fernandez, Belete

Pace

Relatively fast: 400m 1.06,06 and 800m 2.15,32

The start

The start is a bit unusual because the three inside starters Kostetskaya, Harrer and Uceny all start faster than the rest of the field. This allows Uceny to take first position in the green queue behind the leader, which normally would be difficult for a runner starting third from the inside. The rest of the field settles in as expected.

The jog

Kostetskaya clearly intends to take the lead in the start and she leads the jog with a fast pace. She’s the number two favorite in this race behind Alptekin and apparently comfortable running in front. Not many runners share this preference.

Kostetskaya’s pacemaking leaves all the other runners locked into their positions all the way from 200m to the end of the jog at 1000m. The only exception is Dobriskey. She uses the 600-700 straight to move up from last place in the red queue to third place in the green. This is a somewhat risky tactical move when the pace is fast. Although Dobriskey successfully passes many opponents on the straight, there isn’t enough room for her to properly move into the green queue before the curve (700-800). She ends up running this curve in the middle of lane 2.

On the back straight (800-900) Dobriskey still can’t find a position closer to the inside, so she takes on extra distance in the next curve (900-1000) as well. Kostetskaya has now slowed down considerably, which also works to Dobriskey’s disadvantage because it prevents her from finding any gaps inside. On the other hand it is also easier for Dobriskey to keep up in the curves when the pace is slower. She does maintain good striking position in the green queue, which might have been worth the extra distance after all.

The surge

The pace increases at the 1000m mark, but most runners are surprisingly passive on the straight (1000-1100). This might be because all four favorites are in front. They will probably not be easy to pass, so average contestants and underdogs may as well conserve their strength in the curve (1100-1200) before beginning the sprint. The race has also been fairly fast, which could make a move to the outside too costly.

Belete breaks the pattern with a sudden sprint outward just before 1100m. It might have been wiser for her to sprint earlier on the straight, because now she’s forced to run a wide curve. But she runs fast enough to pass everyone except Alptekin in the curve, so she achieves what she intended.

Rowbury’s response to Belete’s acceleration at 1080m is also worth noting. Rowbury was in the red queue in the first lap and then held a blue position to the end of the jog. At 1000m she’s in 9th place, inconveniently separated from the four favorites. However, when Belete jumps out Rowbury suddenly sees an opening and immediately accelerates. This quick reaction was essential to her success in the sprint in this race, because it allowed her to follow Uceny. If Harrer or McKnight had filled the gap instead, Rowbury would have had to work past them. She would probably not have qualified for the final. This illustrates why it’s so crucial to fill gaps quickly in the surge.

The sprint

In the end Belete did not quite manage to keep her bold sprint going all the way to the finish. The sprint was a full-speed race where no contestants had to make tactical decisions.

This analysis is based on my guidebook to 1500m tactics, available here on thcson.com. This time I will analyze the men’s first semifinal in the London Olympics:

Race video on YouTube

Men’s 1500m semifinal 1

Relative ability

Season bests (as reported in the start list) give the following classification for this heat:

Favorites: Makhloufi, Kiprop, Gebremedhin

Average contestants: Driouch, Murray, Gregson, Kowal, Moustaoui, Shaween (both Moustaoui and Shaween have slow season bests but fast times from 2011)

Underdogs: Ingebrigtsen, Wheating, Manzano

Pace

The beginning was the slowest men’s race in the Oympics: 400m 1.03,73 and 800m 2.07,20. However, the surge was fast.

The start

This is an interesting start because two favorites (Makhloufi & Kiprop) and one underdog (Ingebrigtsen) seem anxious to lead. Starting sixth from the inside, Makhloufi is fastest and takes the inside lane after about 50m. Inside starters Ingebrigtsen and Driouch also start very fast and Ingebrigtsen even passes Makhloufi before the curve. In principle there shouldn’t be a reason to pass a favorite who wants to lead, but Ingebrigtsen’s move may be a reaction to Makhloufi slowing down at 80m. In any case, Ingebrigtsen gets lucky when Kiprop, another pre-race favorite, decides to accelerate and take the lead. Kiprop may not have intended to lead. Makhloufi slowing down on the inside seems to move him in front unexpectedly.

The jog

Kiprop runs the first curve in lane 2, clearly reluctant to lead the group. But Ingebrigtsen wisely stays half a step behind him in lane 1 to avoid the lead position. This is good tactical running from them both, and it results in a slow first lap, as one would expect. Kiprop and Ingebrigtsen wait for someone to move up from the back of the group, but this does not happen.

Realising that the pace is slow, Murray makes a nice move on the first straight (200-300) all the way from the back to third place. He gets past the entire group without wasting any energy at all. He must have thought about, and perhaps executed, this tactic before.

Not much changes from 300m to 600m. It’s starting to feel likely that only five direct qualifiers from this semifinal will make it to the final as the field passes 600m at 1.35.

The surge

In  this race the surge starts very early as a collective acceleration at 650m. The pressure building up around Gregson disturbs his rhythm and he jumps to the front partly to avoid the pushing. Kiprop doesn’t want to be boxed in, so he moves past Gregson on the inside. Gregson did not seem too keen on taking the lead in the first place. The sudden movements from 650-720m are so quick and unpredictable that it’s largely a matter of luck where runners in the middle of the pack find themselves in the curve (700-800). Kowal makes a good move forward on the straight (600-700) and even takes the lead for a moment, but he’s apparently not expecting the pace to increase, so he slows down at the exact moment when Gregson jumps forward. Much of the gains Kowal made on the straight are lost when the curve begins, as other runners pursue Gregson and Kiprop more actively. This illustrates the difficulty of tactical running in a very slow race. You have to be ready to respond to new events, even when you have just successfully completed your previous tactical move.

Kiprop now sets such a good pace (57 seconds) that everyone pretty much stays in the same position from 700 to 1100m. The others clearly have their hands full in trying to follow him. At this point Kiprop’s only tactic is to lead all the way to the finish by himself. If he slows down, he will soon be boxed in.

The 700-1100 lap is tough for the runners in the outside lanes. Gregson, Murray, Moustaoui, Gebremedhin and Shaween run both curves in lane 2. In order to cover the lap in 57 seconds, they in fact have to run at 55,9 seconds / 400m pace. However, I don’t think any of them could have reasonably avoided lane 2 in this lap. In a slow race, especially a semifinal, all runners are going to feel fresh when the surge begins. There will not be any open gaps on the inside until someone tires. As we see in this race, that can take a while.

Inside runners such as Driouch, Ingebrigtsen and Manzano have the good fortune of running a short distance in the 700-1100 lap, but they still face the risk of being boxed in as the final lap begins. Kiprop saves them from this fate by accelerating again at 1100m. Gregson, Murray, Moustaoui, Gebremedhin and Shaween are forced to run yet another curve in lane 2 since the green queue fails to make any progress over the red queue. Makhloufi ran the 700-1100 lap in blue position. He now utilizes the space left open by fading outside runners to move into better striking position as the sprint begins.

The sprint

Neither stage of this sprint is tactical since every runner seems to be running pretty much at maximum speed already on the back straight (1200-1300). However, it’s worth noting that underdogs Manzano and Ingebrigtsen manage to outsprint many stronger opponents. Their inside positions in the surge clearly had something to do with their success in the sprint, and Kiprop’s tactic in the front clearly benefited them. Moustaoui makes the unfortunate mistake of letting Ingebrigtsen pass him on the inside just before the finish line.