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Here’s a tactical recap of the 800m heats which ended a moment ago.

Race videos

Heat 1

Heat 2

Heat 3

Heat 4

Heat 5

Heat 6

Analyses

Heat 1

Gakeme was not quite sure what he wanted to do in this heat. He was slow in the first 100 and moved to the inside lane at the 200m mark. This isn’t a bad place to be in a heat with only seven runners, but he made a very badly timed move outward at the 400m mark and ran the entire 400-500 bend in lane 2 for no gain at all. He still made his way into the top three, but could have done it with less work. Amos ran a much smarter race, waiting in the green queue like a favorite should and picking off opponents one by one in the sprint.

Heat 2

It looked like Aman would be stuck in the box for the first lap, but he wisely utilized an open gap on the 300-400 straight to move outward. Langford is the athlete who left the gap open in the green queue, as he inexplicably fell back two steps in the queue on the 300-400 straight for no apparent reason.

Bosse seemed to track Aman on the final lap, which is no doubt a good tactic. But then he allowed Langford to go past him far too easily on the 500-600 straight. He could have forced Langford further out and prevented the overtaking by moving up to Aman’s shoulder. Luckily for Bosse, Langford’s energy ran out in the 600-700 bend and Bosse managed to pass him on the inside when other athletes ahead of him sprinted away much faster than Langford did. If Langford had been able to keep up with the others in the 600-700 bend Bosse would have been in trouble on the final straight.

Heat 3

This was a relatively fast heat with only six contestants, so there were really no tactics at all.

Heat 4

Kupers set a fast pace, so not much tactics in this heat either. Lewandowski fell back to fifth place in the sprint, but it is not due to any tactical mistakes. It does not look like he was close enough to close the gap on the inside where Lopez comes through in the final 40 meters.

Heat 5

This was an impressive tactical run by Kszczot. He patiently stayed in his boxed position up to 500m and quickly overtook van Rensburg when he seemed to be slower than the others on the 500-600 straight. Kszczot could have moved out before the final bend, but he returned back to the inside lane and got slightly boxed again before finding a suitable gap outward just when the final straight began. He won’t be able to pass out of boxed positions so easily in the semifinals, but in this first round heat this conservative tactic worked perfectly.

Heat 6

Rimmer did everything right in this heat. Instead of staying in an outside position in the 400-500 bend he turned inward, reaching an advantageous position in lane 1 behind the two favorites Rudisha and Balla. As the favorites led the sprint Rimmer clearly managed to save more energy than his evenly matched opponents Kuciapski and Bube, who ran the outside route. But in the end it just wasn’t enough as Rimmer lost the sprint not only to the two favorites he had been following, but also to Rotich, who covered more distance on the outside in the final lap.

Here’s a tactical recap of the 1500m heats which ended a moment ago. It is based on the tactical guidebook I have published on this webpage.

Race videos

Heat 1

Heat 2

Heat 3

Analyses

Heat 1

Coneo set a fast pace in this heat. With the first 6 in each heat + 6 fastest times qualifying for the semifinals it seemed likely that a lot of athletes would go through from this heat. Consequently there wasn’t much tactics in this heat, but it was interesting to observe how closely packed the lead group staid until the final meters at such a fast pace. Rowbury and Johnson were boxed in throughout the sprint and Rowbury could easily have fallen out of the top six if Chepkwemoi had faded in the end. There was not much that Rowbury could have done differently in the sprint, but in the end the fast pace was fast enough to carry the entire lead group to the semifinals, even Coneo who fell behind in the sprint.

Heat 2

Hassan took a very passive strategy in this heat by moving directly to the back of the red queue in the start. Aregawi also started slowly but moved to the green queue instead, which is a better tactic for favorites. Simpson utilized her outside start position nicely to stay on the outside and find a place at the front of the green queue.

The jog stage was very unusual, as Tomasova went off one her own and Simpson decided not to follow her at the 300m mark. After that the main group ran its own race and Tomasova her own. Seyaum volunteered for pace-keeping duty in the main group and managed to pull away from the others in the sprint without any danger of boxing. However, she wasted a lot of energy in this heat, first by pace-keeping and then by running a pointless sprint against Hassan for first place. She may struggle in the semifinals tomorrow with no rest day in between.

Hassan waited until the 1200m mark before she made her move and this was clearly a wise tactic, as she easily overtook seven or eight opponents in the first sprint. Hassan will have to adopt a more active strategy in the semifinals when the competition is tougher.

Heat 3

It’s always interesting to see how an overwhelming favorite runs in the first round. Dibaba started with the same strategy as Hassan, deliberately taking the last position in the start. This might be the best way to stay of trouble if there’s any scuffling in the beginning. Dibaba then moved up to a good position in the green queue on the 600-700 straight, but failed to defend this position on the following 800-900 straight when Magnani overtook her. Dibaba then overtook Magnani in the 900-1000 bend to correct her mistake, and on the following 1000-1100 she paid closer attention when she stopped Terzic from overtaking her. Dibaba’s sprint was well-timed and secure, although a 59 second lap was clearly excessive in this round.

This was a moderately fast heat even before Dibaba took the lead, so there wasn’t much tactics involved for the other runners. Everyone had plenty of space in the sprint. Kipyegon probably used too much energy by running the second lap in lane 2, moving up to take the lead at 900m and then following Dibaba all the way on her final 59 second lap. Kipyegon will probably feel this in her legs tomorrow much more than Dibaba. Weightman ran a smarter sprint by letting Dibaba go and slowing down just enough to secure a place in the top six.

This analysis is based on my guidebook to 1500m tactics, available here on thcson.com. In this post I will analyze the women’s final in the London Olympics, which can be viewed on YouTube:

Race video on YouTube

Women’s 1500m final

Relative ability

Season bests and previous heats give the following classification for this heat:

Favorites: Tomashova, Obiri, Aregawi, Alptekin, Kostetskaya

Average contestants: Rowbury, Kareiva, Klocova, Bulut, Jamal, Uceny, Dobriskey, Weightman

Underdogs: So many runners ran fast in the second semifinal that nobody really stood out as an underdog in the final.

Pace

The race started slowly but the pace increased gradually: 400m 1.15,12 and 800m 2.23,97

The start

This was perhaps the most calm 1500m start in these Olympics. Bulut and the other inside and middle starters end up in red or blue positions behind her. All outside starters take green positions as expected. Nobody makes a tactical move.

The jog

It seems like Bulut did not intend to be a pacemaker at this stage, so she slows the pace to a crawl in the first curve in the inside lane. This isn’t an effective way to exit the front position, as I explained in my guide. Nobody else wants to lead, so eventually Bulut decides to go to the front after all. Perhaps Bulut reasoned that she won’t be any worse off leading the field at this pace than if she’s boxed into the red queue.

Tomasova kept a fast pace both in her heat and her semifinal, but she is now unable to do so. I assume she would have liked to use her favorite strategy in the final as well, but she gets boxed in from the beginning and Bulut’s slowdown in prevents her from moving outward until after the 800m point. This shows how crucial starting position can be. In order to take get into the green queue Tomashova would have had to either start fast enough to beat the outside starters or start slowly enough to take the last position in the green queue and move up from there.

Bulut increase the pace a little in the second lap, but it is still remarkable that nobody changes positions. Weightman and Dobriskey don’t move up on the outside from 400-700m. Even more surprisingly, pre-race favorite Obiri remains at the back of the field even though she could surely have move up to the front with ease on the 600-700 straight.

Bulut seems to increase the pace again at 800m and the group finally starts to become a bit restless. Tomashova forces her way further out, but remains partly boxed in behind Uceny.

The surge

At 1000m Jamal, Kostetskaya and Uceny are all in ideal striking position in the green queue. It’s surprising that Aregawi and Obiri don’t try harder to move upward on the 1000-1100 straight. Their positions at the back of the green queue expose them to a lot of extra distance in the 1100-1200 curve with little tactical benefit.

On the 1000-1100 straight Rowbury makes a serious tactical mistake when she leaves an open gap in the red queue which Alptekin proceeds to fill. Tomashova remains boxed into a blue position. She is freed from the box when Uceny’s unfortunate fall disrupts the green queue on the outside, but the pace is already so fast that she declines the opportunity to move outward.

Just before the 1200m point Alptekin gets out her red position, apparently by utilizing the gap left by Kostetskaya when she’s unable to keep up with Jamal in the green queue.

The sprint

Aregawi comes storming on the outside as the sprint begins, but her loss of rhythm after Uceny’s fall is costly in the sprint. Bulut puts together an amazing sprint considering that she led the race for so long. All in all there weren’t any tactical moves to discuss in this sprint.

Overall the women’s final was noteworthy mostly for its lack of change in positions. The inside starters were in the red queue, middle starters in blue positions and outside starters in the green queue pretty much all the way from the start to 1100m. This shows how important it can be to consider your starting positions in strategic pre-race plans. Inside starters who prefer to be in the green queue, as Tomashova probably did, may have to do a deliberately slow start and then work their way up from the back of the field. With a normal start they may find themselves boxed in for several laps.

Another thing to note is Alptekin’s good luck in the final lap. She’s in the blue queue just before 1100m, but then Rowbury leaves a gap in the red queue so that Alptekin can run the 1100-1200 curve in lane 1. Kostetskaya then fades on the outside just as the sprint begins, allowing Alptekin to break out of the box. If Aregawi had been in the green queue instead of Kostetskaya, Alptekin’s options would have much more restricted at least in the first stage of the sprint.

This analysis is based on my guidebook to 1500m tactics, available here on thcson.com. This time I will analyze the men’s final in the London Olympics.

Race video on YouTube

Men’s 1500m final

Relative ability

Season bests and previous heats give the following classification for this heat:

Favorites: Makhloufi’s dominant sprints in both of his heats made him the primary favorite. Kiprop, Kiplagat, Chepseba and Willis were secondary favorites based on season bests.

Average contestants: Iguider, Gebremedhin, Ozbilen

Underdogs: Centrowitz, Manzano, Ali, Ingebrigtsen

Pace

The final was relatively fast, 400m 58,30 and 800m 1.58,63, possibly because some runners wanted to neutralize Makhloufi’s sprint.

The start

This is a strange start. The primary pre-race favorite Makhloufi goes out very fast and looks set to take the lead, but Iguider goes through a lot of trouble to move behind Makhloufi’s and go past him. It is hard to see why Iguider so desperately wants to avoid running behind a favorite in the inside lane, but perhaps the excitement just gave him an extra burst of adrenaline. Ingebrigtsen and Ali also seem assertive with their fast starts. Kiprop takes it easy, which leaves him at the back of the field.

The jog

Iguider does not intend to keep a fast pace, so Ali and Chepseba pass him easily on the 200-300 straight. Kiprop also moves up on the outside, but for some reason he does not latch onto Chepseba. One would assume that second position in the green queue, behind a compatriot whose also a favorite, would be ideal for Kiprop. Instead, his primary rival Makhloufi moves into that green position. If Kiprop would have kept up with Chepseba, Makhloufi could have been enclosed in a blue position instead, forcing him to make more difficult tactical decisions in the later stages of the race. Kiprop never manages to move up after this initial hesitation. He seems to have had a very bad day.

Ali keeps the pace fast and the other runners settle in good order into two queues. Absolutely nothing changes in the field during the second lap. As they come through 800m in 1.58,63, it’s clear that pace hasn’t been fast enough to neutralize Makhloufi’s sprint, so the Kenyans could perhaps look to cooperate in a long and fast surge. Unfortunately for Chepseba, he’s the only one of the three Kenyans who’s anywhere near the lead. He takes the front position at 900m. Makhloufi has kept an eye on Chepseba, as he should have, and he immediately moves one step forward in the green queue when Chepseba takes the lead.

Centrowitz also makes a good tactical move in going outward on the 800-900 straight. He has first position in the red queue behind Ali, but Ali is an underdog and has been keeping the pace for a long time, so staying put behind him would probably leave Centrowitz boxed in when the surge begins. By moving one step outward Centrowitz takes first place in the green queue just as Chepseba takes the lead, which is clearly an excellent tactical position.

The surge

The surge begins as Chepseba takes the lead. Willis and Ingebrigtsen seem to be in trouble on the inside in the 900-100 curve because they’re stuck behind Ali. Luckily for them, Ali decides to fight his way outward instead of following Chepseba, so Willis and Ingebrigtsen both get to move one step forward in the red queue for free. This is pure luck on their part, but it puts them both in good position behind pre-race favorites in the inside lane.

On the outside, Gebremedhin and Kiplagat move up in the 900-1000 curve. Kiplagat probably goes all the way out to lane 3 to move past Gebremedhin. These are good tactical moves by them both, because the outside routes would probably have been blocked by Iguider (whom they both pass in the curve) if they had waited to the 1000-1100 straight. Since this is the final and the competition is very even, the price for a good position on the outside is higher than it was in the heats.

Kiplagat moves up to Makhloufi’s shoulder at 1000m. Makhloufi again makes the right tactical move as he blocks Kiplagat by moving forward, thus avoiding the boxed-in blue position. As a pre-race favorite with a strong sprint, he clearly makes the right decision. All pre-race favorites except Kiprop are at the front as the last lap begins. Centrowitz, who scored a medal the year before in Daegu, is among them.

The sprint

The sprint begins at 1100m, as it often does in the final. The pace is so fast through the 1100-1200 curve that noone can change positions. Makhloufi strikes at 1200 as he did in the heats. Chepseba cannot respond and the field spreads out widely. The only tactical question is when runners at the back of the group pass Chepseba. Centrowitz and Willis are slow to react to Makhloufi’s move, letting Kiplagat, Gebremedhin and Iguider all pass them and Chepseba on the outside. Judging from the final stages of the sprint Willis may already have been out of energy at 1200, but Centrowitz comes close to a medal, so in retrospect he probably should have sprinted past Chepseba on the 1200-1300 straight instead of in the curve.

Manzano’s sprint is a sight to behold, so it’s worthwhile to recap his earlier tactics during the race. His starting position gave him a position in the green queue for the first lap, then he ran close to the back of the red queue for the rest of jog. When Chepseba initiated the surge he stayed inside behind Ingebrigtsen and actually seemed to have trouble keeping up at the 1000m mark. One would think that an underdog cannot have any chance of sprinting successfully from so far behind, especially in a final. But he runs the final 200 in 26,5 while Kiplagat and Gebremedhin only manage 28,9 and 28,1, respectively. Ingebrigtsen runs 27,1 for the final 200, passing both Gebremedhin and Kiplagat to take fifth place.

With three underdogs in the top 5, this race is a testament to how much underdogs can achieve with smart tactics on a good day. It goes without saying that the differences between underdogs and others is small in a championship final. But the important tactical lesson which Manzano and Ingebrigtsen exemplify is that a fast finish can be incredibly effective in the final straight even against favorites. Many favorites run the last lap, if not the entire race, in the outside lanes. Kiplagat and Gebremedhin did so from 900 to 1300m. The price they pay for that outside running can be high in the final sprint, so underdogs with conserved energy have every reason to keep hope alive to the very end of the race.

As for the victor, there have been allegations of cheating due to his surprising improvement from the year before, but at least in terms of tactics he proved himself a worthy champion. He was twice at risk of being boxed in and responded on both occasions immediately with the right decision.